non-technical summary
The remarkable increase in oil price volatility over the past decade sparked an intensive debate about its driving factors. Many studies argue that the stronger oil price ‡uctua-tions can solely be explained by sharp movements in fundamental oil supply and demand, whereas others claim that also …nancial speculation could have played a some role. A factor which has been overlooked in this debate is that in periods of strong oil price volatility, uncertainty about the macroeconomic outlook is typically very high. It is well documented that increased uncertainty can in ‡uence the decision behavior of economic agents. Higher uncertainty causes a delay in the production or consumption decision, thereby lowering the quantity response and increasing the price impact of shocks. Analogously, uncertainty could a¤ect the responsiveness of oil prices and production to fundamental oil shocks, and thereby change oil price volatility.
In this paper, we evaluate whether the impact of fundamental oil shocks di¤ers in times of increased uncertainty. We de…ne macroeconomic uncertainty as volatility in world industrial production growth. Using a threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model, we endogenously identify high and low uncertainty regimes based on this measure of macroeconomic volatility crossing an estimated threshold. Conditional on being in a particular regime, we quantify the impact of di¤erent types of oil shocks on oil prices, oil production and economic activity. We identify three types of oil shocks using sign restrictions; oil supply shocks, oil demand shocks driven by economic activity, and oil- Our results show that the impact of oil demand and supply shocks tends to di¤er substantially when macroeconomic uncertainty is high. Oil shocks have a signi…cantly stronger e¤ect on oil prices for a given response of oil production, implying that the price elasticity of oil demand and supply is lower in the high uncertainty regime. In other words, the oil demand and oil supply curve become steeper in uncertain times. More speci…cally, we estimate the impact oil demand elasticity to decline from a range of -0.52 to -0.15 when uncertainty is low, to -0.36 to -0.11 when uncertainty is high. The oil supply elasticity drops from a range of 0.21 to 0.03, to a number in between 0.15 and 0.02 conditional on a highly uncertain outlook. Although there is some overlap across the regimes, the di¤erence in estimated elasticity across regimes is statistically signi…cant. The di¤erence is also economically signi…cant, as the price impact of a similar change in oil production might easily double when the oil shock hits the economy in uncertain times. Hence, we show that di¤erent levels of macroeconomic uncertainty over time can explain time variation in the price elasticity of oil, and therefore in oil price volatility. The …ndings are robust to variations in the speci…cation of the model, identi…cation of the shocks and the measure of uncertainty. As far as we are aware, this is the …rst paper considering a role for macroeconomic uncertainty in explaining changes in the impact of oil shocks, and that endogenously explains variations in the elasticity of oil demand and supply over time.
In the discussion on the driving factors behind the recent rollercoaster ride in oil prices, our …ndings imply that the contribution of oil demand and supply shocks to the oil price could be larger than previously estimated, once the non-linearity of the price elasticity of oil demand and supply is taken into account.
Introduction
The remarkable increase in oil price volatility over the past decade sparked an intensive debate about its driving factors. Many studies argue that the stronger oil price ‡uctua- Others claim that changes in fundamentals are not su¢ cient to explain the full extent of the oil price ‡uctuations, and argue that also …nancial speculation played a role (Lombardi and Van Robays 2011, Tang and Xiong 2011, Singleton 2012) . A factor which has been overlooked in this debate is that in periods of strong oil price volatility, uncertainty about the macroeconomy was typically very high. It is well documented that increased uncertainty can in ‡uence the decision behavior of economic agents (Bernanke 1983, Pindyck 1991, Litzenberger and Rabinowitz 1995, Bloom et al. 2007 ). Higher uncertainty causes a delay in the production or consumption decision, thereby lowering the quantity response and increasing the price impact of shocks. Analogously, uncertainty could a¤ect the responsiveness of oil prices to fundamental oil shocks, and thereby change oil price volatility.
In this paper, we evaluate whether the impact of fundamental oil shocks di¤ers in times of increased uncertainty. We de…ne macroeconomic uncertainty as volatility in world industrial production growth. Using a monthly threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model that we estimate over the period 1986:01-2011:07, we endogenously identify high and low uncertainty regimes based on our measure of macroeconomic volatility crossing an estimated threshold. Conditional on being in a particular regime, we quantify the impact of di¤erent types of oil shocks on oil prices, oil production and economic activity.
We identify three types of oil shocks using sign restrictions; oil supply shocks, oil demand shocks driven by economic activity, and oil-speci…c demand shocks, similar to Peersman Kilian and Murphy (2012) . The aim of this paper is to establish some stylized facts on the interaction between uncertainty and oil price volatility that seem worthwhile exploring further in general equilibrium models.
Our results show that the impact of oil demand and supply shocks tends to di¤er substantially when macroeconomic uncertainty is high. Oil shocks have a signi…cantly stronger e¤ect on oil prices for a given response of oil production, implying that the price elasticity of oil demand and supply is lower in the high uncertainty regime. In other words, the oil demand and oil supply curve become steeper in uncertain times. We estimate the impact oil demand elasticity to decline from a range of -0.52 to -0.15 when uncertainty is low, to -0.36 to -0.11 when uncertainty is high. The oil supply elasticity drops from a range of 0.21 to 0.03, to a number in between 0.15 and 0.02 conditional on a highly uncertain environment. Although there is some overlap across the regimes, the di¤erence in estimated elasticity across regimes is statistically signi…cant. The di¤erence is also economically signi…cant, as the price impact of a similar oil shock might double when it hits the economy in uncertain times. Hence, we show that di¤erent levels of macroeconomic uncertainty over time can explain time variation in the price elasticity of oil, and therefore in oil price volatility. Hamilton (2009) and Kahn (2009) argue that a lower price elasticity could explain why fundamental oil supply and demand shocks impacted more strongly on oil prices over the last decade, and we empirically demonstrate that this could have been the case because of higher uncertainty. Moreover, not only oil prices and oil production react di¤erently, but also economic activity reacts more aggressively to oil shocks when macroeconomic volatility is already high.
As far as we are aware, this is the …rst paper which estimates the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on the e¤ects of oil shocks, and manages to endogenously explain time variation in the price elasticity of oil. On the one hand, several studies have touched upon the relationship between uncertainty and oil prices. However, mostly they focus on uncertainty with respect to the oil price itself, i.e. oil price volatility instead of macro- 1 On the other hand, numerous studies have documented an increase in the volatility of oil prices over time, and explained this by varying elasticities of oil demand and supply (Lee, Ni and Ratti 1995 , Ferderer 1996 , Regnier 2007 , Baumeister and Peersman 2008 , 2012 . We link these two strands in the oil literature by showing that time variation in the oil price elasticity, and hence in oil price volatility, can be explained by variation in the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some intuition and evidence on why uncertainty could matter for the impact of oil shocks.
In Section 3, we describe the threshold VAR model and its speci…cation, test for thresh-1 Two exceptions to this are Pindyck (1980) and Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) , although their focus is di¤erent. Pindyck (1980) concentrates on the theoretical e¤ect of demand and oil reserves uncertainty on expected oil price behavior, and Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) focus on explaining backwardation in oil futures markets.
old e¤ects and explain the identi…cation strategy. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 brie ‡y evaluates the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.
How Can Uncertainty A¤ect the Oil Market?
A lower price elasticity of oil demand and supply during uncertain economic times means that shocks hitting the oil market generate larger responses in prices but smaller responses in quantities compared to more certain times. In this section, we discuss several possible ways in which macroeconomic uncertainty can negatively impact on the price elasticity of oil demand and supply. These explanations are not mutually exclusive and mainly serve to provide intuition behind the results and possible avenues for further research.
First, both oil demand and oil supply could be less responsive because of an option value to wait. Under the condition that the action to be decided on is irreversible, uncertainty creates an option value to wait through which investors are willing to forego current returns in order to gain from more information in the future. In other words, uncertainty over future demand reduces current investment. There exists a large literature providing both theoretical and empirical evidence on this link. Bernanke (1983) relies on this concept to explain cyclical ‡uctuations in investment, and in more recent work, Bloom et al. (2007) and Bloom (2009) con…rm that …rms delay investment and hiring decisions because of higher uncertainty about future demand. 2 Accordingly, in the oil market, following an oil demand shock that occurs when macroeconomic volatility is already high, crude oil producers could decide to wait with changing their production until more information is available on the persistence of the oil shock as well as on its impact on the already fragile economy. This option value to wait would then lower the elasticity of oil supply. Using an econometrical model of …rm's optimal drilling investment under time-varying uncertainty, Kelogg (2010) indeed shows that higher uncertainty about future revenues causes drilling …rms to delay their investments in oil wells. Guiso and Parigi (1999) …nd the e¤ect of demand uncertainty on the responsiveness of investment to be stronger if it is harder to reverse investment decisions and if the …rm has more market power, which is characteristic to oil …rms. Similarly, the elasticity of oil demand could be lower as oil consumers prefer to wait with reducing their demand following an oil supply shock that pushes oil prices upwards. In addition, uncertainty could reduce the tendency of oil consumers to substitute oil for other energy products, or at least delay substitution until there is more certainty about the e¤ect of the oil shock.
Second, futures markets might also play a role in explaining why oil demand and supply elasticities vary over time. Baumeister and Peersman (2012) note that hedging against oil price movements could weaken the responsiveness of oil demand and supply. Accordingly, if higher macroeconomic uncertainty leads to an increased use of futures contracts, which is plausible given that futures markets exist to transfer risks, it could cause the oil price elasticity of demand and supply to decline.
Third, the oil supply elasticity could decline during uncertain periods because oil producers prefer to leave oil reserves below the ground when uncertainty rises. In a two period equilibrium model, Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) show that uncertainty increases the value of oil reserves below the ground for any level of the extraction cost. As oil producers will not extract oil as long as the net value of oil below the ground is higher than that above the ground, an increase in uncertainty will lower the extraction of oil.
Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) also …nd empirical support for this.
Finally, uncertainty could also a¤ect price setting in the oil spot and futures markets without the need for immediate oil demand and supply adjustments. Singleton (2012) shows that heterogeneous beliefs about public information concerning the future course of economic events can induce higher price volatility, price drifts and even booms and busts in prices. The release of new information about oil supply and demand can have a large e¤ect on prices as investors learn about the economic environment. Although Singleton (2012) uses these arguments to explain the role of …nancial ‡ows on oil prices, they could also help in understanding why in times of higher macroeconomic uncertainty, when investors' beliefs typically diverge more than in normal times, shocks to oil demand and supply have a larger impact response on prices.
Model and Identi…cation

Threshold VAR model
To evaluate the role of macroeconomic uncertainty on the oil market, we rely on a structural threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model. The threshold model is attributed to Tong (1978) and has been extensively used afterwards, see Hansen (2011) for an overview.
The TVAR model enables us to endogenously identify di¤erent regimes with respect to one endogenous transition variable, which is called the threshold variable. In our case, this is a function of macroeconomic uncertainty. The di¤erent regimes are determined by the value of this threshold variable with respect to a certain threshold which is estimated within the model. Once the di¤erent regimes are identi…ed, we generate the impulse response functions conditional upon the regime to compare the estimated e¤ects. In Markov-Switching models, in contrast, the transition variable is typically not observed, which makes the TVAR model particularly attractive for addressing our research question. We estimate a two-regime TVAR model of the following form:
The vector of endogenous variables Y t captures the global dynamics in the oil spot market, i.e. world oil production (Q oil ), the price of crude oil expressed in US dollars (P oil ), a measure of world economic activity (Y w ) and oil inventories (I oil ). To model di¤erent uncertainty regimes, we also add a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty denoted by 
Note that the contemporaneous impact of the shocks is allowed to vary, which is crucial for our analysis of the price elasticities on impact.
The TVAR model is estimated using monthly data over the period 1986:01-2011:07.
We choose 1986 as our starting point for two reasons. First, Baumeister and Peersman 3 We discuss possible endogeneity issues later in this section.
(2008, 2012) document an exogenous structural break in the oil price elasticities around the mid-1980s, after which both the oil demand and oil supply elasticity became substantially smaller. This decline is typically explained by a reduction in spare capacity which reduces the responsiveness of oil supply, and a more limited scope for substitution away from oil which reduces the responsiveness of oil demand. Second, the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s caused a downward shift in the level of uncertainty as macroeconomic volatility declined, which implies a downward shift of the threshold in our model. Including these two events in our sample period could therefore signi…cantly bias the identi…cation of the regimes and the estimation results. 4 The oil price is the nominal re…ner acquisition cost of imported crude oil, which has extensively been used in the literature as the best proxy for the free market global price of imported crude oil. 5 We proxy global economic activity by the OECD measure of global industrial production, which covers the OECD countries and the six major non-OECD economies, including e.g. China and India. Following Kilian and Murphy (2010), we proxy global crude oil inventories as total US crude oil inventories scaled by the ratio of OECD petroleum stocks over US petroleum stocks. Global macroeconomic uncertainty is proxied by the volatility of world industrial production growth, which is modelled as a GARCH(1,1) process. 6 To ensure robustness of our …ndings, we construct two additional measures of uncertainty. Following Baum and Wan (2010), the …rst alternative measure is the conditional variance of US GDP production growth. We generate a monthly GDP series by interpolating quarterly GDP using industrial production based on the Chow-Lin procedure, after which we model the conditional variance as a GARCH(1,1) process. As a second alternative, we consider the Chicago Board of Exchange VXO stock market volatility measure. The VXO index is based on a hypothetical at the money S&P100 option, 4 The fact that macroeconomic uncertainty decreased around the same time that the price elasticity of oil declined does not contradict our results, i.e. increased uncertainty lowers the price elasticity of oil.
This is because the break in the oil price elastcicity around the mid-1980s is found to be exogenous, see Peersman (2008, 2012) . 5 We use the nominal price oil because this should allow for a better identi…cation of the di¤erent types of oil shocks. For example, when we would de ‡ate the nominal price of oil by US CPI, it could be that a domestic positive demand shock to the US could wrongly be identi…ed as a negative oil supply shock because real oil prices fall, and oil production and economic activity do not decline (see Section 3.3 for more details on the shock identi…cation). The results are robust to using the real price of oil. 6 The GARCH(1,1) gives the best speci…cation for modelling the conditional variance according to various information criteria. We estimated the conditional variance over the period 1985-2011 to avoid a possible bias due to the Great Moderation.
and is the measure of uncertainty used by Bloom (2009) . We constructed a monthly series of the VXO index by taking monthly averages of the daily closing price. As noted by Baum and Wan (2010) , these di¤erent measures capture di¤erent types of uncertainty.
The measure based on GDP growth is designed to re ‡ect the overall uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment, whereas the measure based on industrial production disregards uncertainty about the service sector. The VXO stock market volatility measure is more closely related to …nancial market uncertainty. Note that the …rst two measures of uncertainty are backward looking as these are based on GARCH models, whereas the measure based on the VXO index is essentially forward looking. 7 As data on world GDP growth is not available, we have a trade-o¤ between modeling volatility on a global scale using industrial production (and hence excluding the service sector), or using the volatility of total economic activity but then on the level of the US. Given that oil prices are set at a global level, we choose the global industrial production measure as our preferred indicator of macroeconomic uncertainty. The results indicate that the conclusions hold for the other measures of uncertainty as well.
We include four lags of the endogenous variables based on the conventional lag length criteria. Except for macroeconomic uncertainty, all the variables are transformed to monthly growth rates by taking the …rst di¤erence of the natural logarithm. In general, the results are robust to di¤erent speci…cations of the variables and the structural TVAR model, see Section 5 for a more detailed discussion.
Test for Threshold E¤ects and Identi…cation of Regimes
Before testing whether the model is indeed non-linear, and the dynamics between the variables are described by di¤erent regimes, we have to decide on the exact speci…cation of the threshold variable. First, the threshold variable is typically assumed to have a certain delay in determining the regimes, which prevents potential problems of endogeneity between the identi…ed shocks and the regimes. As we model uncertainty as a GARCH process, however, shocks can by construction only a¤ect uncertainty with a delay. Hence, we assume no additional delay in the TVAR model. Second, the threshold variable is typically modeled as a moving average process depending on the persistence of the series (Balke 2000) . As the measures of uncertainty that we employ are highly volatile, we 7 More speci…cally, a GARCH(1,1) model speci…es the variance as a function of a lagged squared error term and the lagged variance:
model the threshold variable as a moving average process of order three to allow for some persistence in the uncertainty regimes, which corresponds to the average volatility of the past quarter.
To test for the signi…cance of threshold e¤ects, we use the approach described in Balke (2000) . If the threshold value was known, the test of linearity under the null hypothesis against the presence of threshold behavior would simply come down to testing Accordingly, as higher oil price movements might also cause higher uncertainty, the results might be subject to an endogeneity bias. Assuming that macroeconomic uncertainty is strictly exogenous with respect to oil shocks might not be realistic. For that reason, the TVAR model allows macroeconomic uncertainty to endogenously respond to oil shocks when identifying the uncertain periods. There are several reasons, however, to believe that an endogeneity bias is negligible if not non-existent. First, the threshold variable is de…ned as a moving average process of macroeconomic uncertainty and is assumed to only switch regimes with a delay of one period. 10 Hence, oil shocks will not cause a regime shift in the same month that the shock hits. By modelling the threshold variable as a three-month moving average process, there should also be some persistence in the increase of macroeconomic uncertainty before it can trigger a regime switch. Second, most of the high uncertainty events identi…ed are not directly linked to oil shocks, and the results are 8 Bloom (2009) identi…es 17 volatility shock events that substantially increased uncertainty, which he uses as 'arguably exogenous'shocks to empirically evaluate the e¤ect of uncertainty shocks. Most of these shocks are caused by economic events, war or terrorism. 9 Using the VXO index, high uncertainty is concentrated around the Black Monday event, the Russian and Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) default, 9/11 Terrorist attack, the Enron and Worldcom accounting scandals, Gulf War II and the …nancial crisis. The working paper version of Bloom (2009) provides more details on these events. 1 0 As mentioned before, this delay is imposed by the GARCH structure of the uncertainty measure.
robust to using …nancial uncertainty instead of macroeconomic uncertainty. Third, the correlation between oil price changes and macroeconomic uncertainty is negative, and when we estimate the model over the total sample, the di¤erent types of structural oil shocks do not signi…cantly a¤ect uncertainty on impact. In addition, the conditional variance decompositions show that the contribution of the oil shocks in explaining variability in macroeconomic uncertainty is small. 11 
Identifying Oil Shocks using Sign Restrictions
In our VAR model, we face the problem that the contemporaneous errors could be correlated. In order to make the shocks orthogonal and thereby econometrically interpretable, we need to impose structure on the model to identify the di¤erent shocks. Given that we only want to evaluate whether uncertainty acts as a reinforcer of oil shocks, we are only interested in identifying the oil shocks.
The oil literature has increasingly recognized that di¤erent factors can drive oil price movements, and that the economic e¤ects of those shocks crucially depend on the under- The sign restrictions are derived from a simple supply-demand scheme of the oil market.
An oil supply shock is an exogenous shift of the oil supply curve to the left and therefore moves oil prices and production in opposite directions. Production disruptions caused by military con ‡icts in the Middle-East are natural examples. As oil prices are higher, global industrial production will not increase following this supply shock. In contrast, shocks on the demand side of the oil market will result in a shift of oil production and oil prices in the same direction. On the one hand, demand for oil can endogenously increase because of changes in macroeconomic activity. A change in the demand for commodities from emerging economies like China or India for example, will shift world economic activity, oil prices and oil production in the same direction. We de…ne such a shock as an oil demand shock driven by economic activity. On the other hand, oil demand can also vary for reasons not related to economic activity. We label these shocks as oil-speci…c demand shocks. Shocks to expected net oil demand in the future, which increases oil inventory demand as a precaution, and oil-gas substitution shocks are two examples. In contrast to demand shocks driven by economic activity, oil-speci…c demand shocks do not have a positive e¤ect on global economic activity as oil prices are higher.
We conduct estimation and inference in the TVAR model in the following way. The estimated threshold value splits the sample period into two subsamples, corresponding to high and low uncertainty states. Conditional upon these two subsamples, we generate two sets of impulse response functions, one estimating the e¤ects in the high uncertainty state and the other in the low uncertainty state. We do this by following the sign restriction procedure of Peersman (2005) Hence, we analyze the change in impact of oil shocks on the oil price elasticity under di¤erent regimes of uncertainty by constructing conditional impulse response functions,
i.e. conditional upon a speci…c uncertainty regime. In most of the TVAR literature, the e¤ects of shocks are evaluated using so-called 'generalized impulse response functions', which allow shocks to cause a switch in regime over the duration of the response. 13 By estimating the responses conditional upon the regimes, we assume that the impact is linear within a regime, but the size and persistence of the responses to similar oil shocks can di¤er. We make this assumption for two main reasons. First, there is an important inconsistency between the non-linear and deterministic character of the GARCH process used to construct the uncertainty measure and the linear structural VAR model, through which including the uncertainty measure in the structural model is not desirable. 14 Constructing generalized impulse response functions is not possible when excluding uncertainty from the structural model, as this uncertainty variable is needed to model the regime transitions after shocks. Therefore, we identify the structural oil shocks in a model that only includes oil prices, oil production, world economic activity and oil inventories. Remember 1 3 See for example the working paper version of Calza and Sousa (2006) for more details, as they construct both the conditional and the generalized impulse response functions. 1 4 More speci…cally, we model macroeconomic uncertainty as a GARCH(1,1) model which has the following representation:
, with " 2 t 1 the lagged squared error term. This squared term causes the impact of shocks on uncertainty to be non-linear, e.g. both positive and negative shocks will increase uncertainty. This non-linearity is not allowed for in the structural linear model that we use to generate the conditional impulse response functions.
that when identifying the uncertainty regimes, we do allow for feedback e¤ects between oil prices and uncertainty, see Section 3.2. Second, constructing generalized impulse response functions when using sign restrictions instead of recursive identi…cation proves to be quite di¢ cult. 15 A drawback of not allowing the shocks to cause switches in regimes during the response might be that the conditional impulse response functions are only informative in the short run. Concerning the estimation of the impact price elasticities of oil demand and supply, however, this assumption does not make any di¤erence. Figure 2 shows the estimated e¤ects of the variables in the TVAR model to di¤erent types of oil shocks in the two regimes. In order to make the e¤ects comparable across regimes, we normalized the contemporaneous response of oil production to a one percent change. The conditional impulse responses are accumulated and shown in levels over the …rst two years after the shock. The shaded responses in the …gure represent the 68 percent posterior probability range of the estimated e¤ects in the high uncertainty regime and the dotted ones represent those conditional on low uncertainty. 16 In Figure 2 , the posterior probability range represents the uncertainty concerning the model speci…cation.
E¤ects of Oil Shocks in Di¤erent Uncertainty Regimes
An overlap between the estimated responses across regimes could thus partly be due to the fact that we are comparing di¤erent model speci…cations. In Figure 3 , we evaluate the signi…cance of the di¤erence in estimated responses across regime per model speci…cation.
The …rst two rows of Figure 2 show the e¤ects of the di¤erent types of shocks on oil prices and oil production. It is clear that for all three oil shocks, a similar impact change in oil production has a much stronger impact e¤ect on the oil price in the high uncertainty regime. 17 This indicates that when macroeconomic conditions are highly uncertain, oil 1 5 In order to model the transition between the regimes following a structural shock, it is necessary that the shocks come from the same model. This assumption is satis…ed for e.g. the Cholesky decomposition, but not when using sign restrictions. Up to our knowledge, only Candelon and Lieb (2011) have used TVAR models in combination with sign restrictions, and they make the same assumption as we do here. 1 6 Note that as we report the posterior range of possible outcomes, the results are not subject to the Fry and Pagan (2011) critique, which only applies when some kind of summary measure such as the median is used. 1 7 During some periods of high uncertainty, small changes in oil demand were associated with enormous variation in the oil price, which might explain why the estimation uncertainty surrounding the oil price response following the oil demand shock driven by economic activity is so high. For example, in the fourth shocks have larger e¤ects on oil prices compared to more normal times. The production response relative to the price response following a shock gives an estimate of the price elasticity. Accordingly, we can estimate the elasticity of oil demand and supply as the ratio of the impact response in oil production and the oil price following oil supply and oil demand shocks respectively. These estimated elasticities are given in the third row of Figure 2 . As expected, the elasticity of both oil demand and supply falls considerably when uncertainty is high. In other words, the oil demand and supply curve become steeper in uncertain times.
Following the oil supply shock, we estimate the oil demand elasticity to decrease from within a range of -0.52 to -0.15 in the low uncertainty regime, to a value within the range of -0.36 to -0.11 in the high uncertainty regime. As there is quite some overlap in estimated elasticities across the regimes, we calculated the signi…cance of the di¤erence in order to evaluate the relevance of the uncertainty e¤ect. Figure 3 displays the 68 percent posterior probability range of the estimated di¤erence in responses between the high and the low uncertainty regime. These estimations show that the di¤erence in estimated oil demand elasticities across regimes is statistically signi…cant. Given that the oil price elasticity in the high uncertainty regime might be less than half its value of the low uncertainty regime, the e¤ect is also economically very signi…cant. The estimated oil demand elasticities are broadly in line with those estimated in the literature. Hamilton For the reason that we have two types of oil demand shocks, we can estimate the curvature of the oil supply curve following the oil demand shock driven by economic activity and following the oil-speci…c demand shock. Figure 2 shows that also the elasticity of oil supply, as proxied by both types of oil demand shocks, tends to be lower when uncertainty is higher. Following the oil demand shock driven by economic activity, the estimated oil supply elasticity drops from a maximum value of 0.21 in the low uncertainty regime to a maximum of 0.15 when uncertainty is high. The minimum estimated elasticity of oil supply reduces from 0.03 to 0.02. Again, these estimates correspond well with the estimates in the literature. Baumeister and Peersman (2012) , for example, estimate the median oil supply elasticity to lie in between 0.02 and 0.25. When the oil supply elasticity is generated through a shift in the oil-speci…c demand curve, the results also show a reduction in the oil supply elasticity conditional on high uncertainty, although the magnitudes di¤er slightly. These di¤erences could be due to the fact that the oil-speci…c demand shock captures a broad set of shocks, i.e. all demand shocks that are not driven by global economic activity. Shocks to expected net oil demand and oil-gas substitution shocks are two examples, and also speculation shocks are thought to be part of it. 18 For the reason that these shocks could trigger diverging responses in oil demand and supply, the estimation of the oil price elasticities could be subject to signi…cant noise. As noted by Baumeister and Peersman (2012) , the di¤erences in the estimated elasticities could also be explained by a di¤erent reaction of oil supply to both shocks in oil demand. Although there again is some overlap between the estimated elasticities, Figure 3 shows that di¤erences are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Not only the oil price elasticity, but also the real economic e¤ects of oil shocks appear to di¤er considerably when uncertainty is high. The fourth row of Figure 2 shows that economic activity appears to react more strongly following oil shocks in the high regime.
The di¤erence in real impact e¤ects across regimes is statistically signi…cant for all three shocks, see Figure 3 . Again, the uncertainty e¤ect is also economically relevant as the impact response in the high uncertainty regime might be twice as large than when uncertainty is low, which could be explained by increased sensitivity of the oil price. At …rst sight, there is no apparent di¤erence between the reaction of oil inventories across regimes.
Nevertheless, Figure 3 indicates that following the oil demand shocks on impact, the reaction of inventories is stronger when uncertainty is high, which corresponds well with 
Robustness of the Results
The main results on the lower price elasticity of oil demand and supply in times of higher uncertainty, and the stronger real economic impact of oil shocks, hold for various speci…cations of the model used. First, our conclusions hold for the real oil price, reasonable variation in the number of lags given our data sample (2, 3 and 5 lags), only imposing the sign restrictions on impact and for di¤erent measures of uncertainty as described in the main text. Second, if we identify regimes of negative growth instead of regimes of higher uncertainty, the overall results remain the same although the signi…cance of the di¤erence across regimes disappears. This indicates that our …ndings concerning the uncertainty effect can not be solely explained by a di¤erent e¤ect of oil shocks on oil prices in recessions versus expansions. These results are available upon request.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes whether the impact of oil shocks di¤ers in times of high and low macroeconomic uncertainty. As it is well documented that uncertainty can a¤ect the decision behavior of economic agents, it could equally impact on the strength at which shocks to oil fundamentals a¤ect oil prices, oil production and economic activity. Several important insights emerge from our analysis. First, a test for the signi…cance of threshold e¤ects indicates that the oil model is non-linear and behaves di¤erently in regimes of high uncertainty which are mostly associated with periods of slowing economic growth, recessions and …nancial crises. Second, higher macroeconomic uncertainty causes oil prices to respond more strongly given a certain change in oil production, implying that the price elasticity of oil demand and supply decreases when uncertainty is higher. The reduction in the oil price elasticity in the high uncertainty regime is both statistically and economically signi…cant. A third, possibly related …nding is that the e¤ect of all types of oil shocks on economic activity is more aggressive in times when macroeconomic volatility is already high. These …ndings are robust to variations in the speci…cation of the model, identi…cation of the shocks and the measure of uncertainty.
As far as we are aware, this is the …rst paper considering a role for macroeconomic uncertainty in explaining changes in the impact of oil shocks, and that endogenously explains variations in the elasticity of oil demand and supply over time. We provide empirical evidence for the arguments made by Hamilton (2009) and Kahn (2009) that fundamental shocks in oil demand and supply impacted more strongly on oil prices over the past decade, and managed to explain why oil price volatility varies over time, as documented by e.g. Baumeister and Peersman (2012) . In the discussion on the driving factors behind the recent rollercoaster ride in oil prices, our …ndings imply that the contribution of oil demand and supply shocks to the oil price could be larger than previously estimated, once the non-linearity of the price elasticity of oil demand and supply is taken into account. We leave the analysis of the channels of transmission through which higher macroeconomic uncertainty a¤ects the price elasticity of oil demand and supply as an interesting avenue for future research. Hansen (1996) for 500 replications are in parenthesis. GDP and CBOE VXO stand respectively for gross domestic product and the Chicago Board of Option Exchange VXO US stock market volatility measure. The sample period is 1986:01-2011:07.
